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 ARE YOU MY MOTHER?   
PARENTAGE IN A NONCONJUGAL 
FAMILY 
 
Natasha Bakht and Lynda M. Collins 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Two women friends and their son made national 1  and 
international2 headlines when a court in Ontario declared 
                                                        
  We are grateful for the invaluable research assistance provided by 
Vanessa Baker-Murray and the kind, creative genius of our lawyer, 
Marta Siemiarczuk. Thanks also to Professor Vanessa Gruben and the 
anonymous peer reviewers for their insightful comments.   
1  See e.g. “How Two Friends Fought to Be Legal ‘Co-Mommas’ to a 7-
Year-Old Boy—and Won”, CBC Radio (21 February 2017), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/radio>; Julie Ireton, “Raising Elaan: Profoundly 
Disabled Boy’s ‘Co-Mommas’ Make Legal History”, CBC News (21 
February 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news>; CTVNews.ca Staff, 
“Groundbreaking Family: Two Women, One Boy and a Legal 
Precedent”, CTV News (21 February 2017), online: 
<www.ctvnews.ca>; Ashley Csanady, “Meet the Co-Mommas: 
Women who Are Partners in Raising a Son, but Not Romantic 
Partners”, National Post (4 April 2017), online: <nationalpost.com>. 
2  See e.g. Tanveer Mann, “Two Best Friends Make Legal History by 
Becoming First to Co-Parent”, Metro (24 February 2017), online: 
<metro.co.uk>; Radhika Sanghani, “Child-Sharing: Meet the Best 
Friends Who’ve Legally Adopted Together”, The Telegraph (31 March 
2017), online: <www.telegraph.co.uk>; Hayley Jones, “Want to Raise 
Kids with Your BFF? Move to Canada”, Daily Beast (27 March 2017), 
online: <www.thedailybeast.com>; Paromita Chakrabarti, “How I Met 
Your Mother”, The Indian Express (9 April 2017), online: 
<indianexpress.com>; Jan Bruck, “Best Friends Become First to Co-
Parent in Canada”, BBC News (22 March 2017), online: 
<www.bbc.com/news>; Monica Coviello, “La mia migliore amica è 
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that Lynda Collins was the parent of then six-year-old 
Elaan Bakht, the biological child of her friend, Natasha 
Bakht. Their story (our story) seemed to touch the hearts of 
many people around the world who were open to and 
interested in yet another family form that defies the 
traditional heteronormative, nuclear model. 3  Our case 
                                                        
diventata mamma di mio figlio”, Vanity Fair (22 March 2017), online: 
<www.vanityfair.it>; Eva Wiseman “Why Shouldn’t the Modern 
Family Be a Team Effort?”, The Guardian (26 March 2017), online: 
<www.theguardian.com/internaitonal>; Radhika Sanghani, “Platonic 
Parenting—Is This the Way of the Future?”, The West Australian (13 
April 2017), online: <thewest.com.au>; Gemma Saura, “Elaan y sus 
madres amigas”m La Vanguardia (24 June 2017), online: 
<www.lavanguardia.com>.  
3  See Outlook, BBC World Service, “’We make a good team . . .’” (21 
March 2017), posted on Outlook,  
BBC World Service, online: Facebook 
<www.facebook.com/BBCOutlook/posts/10155101845682902>; 
BBC News, “Meet Natasha Bakht and Lynda Collins.” (25 March 
2017), posted on BBC News, online: Facebook 
<www.facebook.com/bbcnews/videos/1391064667623263/?autoplay
_reason=user_settings&video_container_type=0&video_creator_prod
uct_type=0&app_id=273465416184080&live_video_guests=0>. See 
also Lynda Collins & Natasha Bakht, “Attention, Canadian Singles: 
Why Not Raise a Child with Your Best Friend?”, CBC (8 May 2017), 
online: <www.cbc.ca>; E-mail from Laila Malik to Natasha Bakht and 
Lynda Collins (24 March 2017):  
 I wanted to write this quick note in the thick of the 
various news pieces about your family that have 
been circulating recently, just to add my deep 
appreciation of all three of you and the joy, 
wonder and radical impact you’re having on the 
world. I imagine that for the most part, you’re just 
doing you, but in the very conservative spaces that 
I sometimes occupy I’m seeing flickers of light 
that I’ve never seen in reaction to the ways you’re 
paving . . . I’ve watched the BBC vid several times 
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began because we found ourselves co-parenting, yet not 
cohabiting, and were quite simply concerned for the future 
of Elaan, who has multiple and complex disabilities. We 
sought an order that would secure Elaan’s existing 
relationship with Lynda and ensure Lynda’s equality with 
other parents.4  
 
 A critique of patriarchal, heteronormative family 
forms has always been central to feminist and critical 
Queer theoretical approaches to law in general and family 
law in particular. 5  Feminist scholars have argued 
convincingly that traditional common law approaches to 
the family have privileged white, able-bodied, middle-
class, heterosexual families (and white, able-bodied, 
middle-class, heterosexual men in particular). Our case 
broke new legal ground, but would almost certainly never 
have happened were it not for the decades of work of 
countless advocates for alternative family forms, including 
those involving single parents, same-sex couples, multi-
generational families, and parents who make use of 
reproductive technologies. There can be little doubt that 
                                                        
now, and am watching people I know to be very 
resistant to anything other than dominant, 
patriarchal narratives of family pause and think. 
Historic indeed, in ways perceptible and 
imperceptible. 
4  See Application for Declaration of Parentage, Collins/Bakht 
(Affidavit of Natasha Bakht at para 17) [Bakht Affidavit]; Application 
for Declaration of Parentage, Collins/Bakht (Affidavit of Lynda 
Collins at paras 19, 20–29) [Collins Affidavit]. 
5 See Fiona Kelly, Transforming Law’s Family: The Legal Recognition 
of Planned Lesbian Motherhood (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011). 
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our success was made possible by the waves of Charter6 
and family law litigation by these communities, which 
prepared the Ontario Superior Court to be open to a family 
structure that was previously unknown to Canadian law. In 
our particular context, we also benefited from the disability 
rights movement and the many parents who fought for the 
right of children with disabilities to be raised at home by 
their families.7 
 
In Part I of this article, we introduce our unique 
parenting partnership: We are friends who do not cohabit, 
but are raising our son, Elaan (who has complex 
disabilities), together. We explain how and why our family 
came into existence. In Part II, we delineate the legal 
arguments we made in order to formalize our relationship, 
specifically, how Lynda was declared Elaan’s parent. Our 
declaration of parentage argument was grounded in the 
Court’s inherent parens patriae jurisdiction. We posit that 
it was in Elaan’s best interests to have Lynda declared a 
second parent, that there was a legislative gap in the 
                                                        
6  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 
[Charter]. 
7  Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res 44/25, UNGAOR, 44th 
Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989) 166 at 167–68 (arts 2, 8). 
See also Mitchell L Yell et al, “The Legal History of Special 
Education: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been!” (1998) 19:4 
Remedial & Special Education 219 at 220. Regrettably, care at home 
is not the universal reality for children with disabilities around the 
world. See Georgette Mulheir, “Deinstitutionalisation: A Human 
Rights Priority for Children with Disabilities” (2012)  
9 Equal Rights Rev 117, online: < 
www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/err9_mulheir.pdf>. 
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Children’s Law Reform Act8 that permitted the Court to 
make the declaration, and that our nonconjugal status was 
not a legal impediment to the declaration.9  
 
In our view, it is always in a child’s best interests 
to have all the emotional, financial, and pragmatic support 
necessary to meet his or her needs. It is, similarly, always 
in a child’s best interest to ensure that his or her custodial 
parent has all the support that she or he needs. There are a 
number of ways to accomplish these twin goals, drawing 
on various sources of support including family, friends, and 
state assistance. Often, and particularly in the cases of 
children born with unanticipated special needs, it takes 
time and experimentation to determine how best to meet a 
child’s needs and those of her custodial parent. In Elaan’s 
case, we found that his needs were best met through a 
combination of support from his biological mother, his 
non-biological mother, extended family, privately-funded 
care, and state support in the form of in-home assistance 
and access to a superb special-needs school. All of these 
pieces were, and are, necessary to ensure his well-being. 
Thus, in his case, it is accurate to say that legal recognition 
                                                        
8  RSO 1990, c C 12 [CLRA]. 
9  Conversely, a conjugal relationship with the biological or adopted 
parent should not be determinative of parental status. The Alberta 
Court of Appeal reached an opposite conclusion in Doe v Alberta, 2007 
ABCA 50, 278 DLR (4th) 1, where the biological mother entered into 
an express written agreement with her cohabiting male partner (who 
did not father the child), which stipulated that the partner had neither 
parental rights nor any obligation to support the child. For an insightful 
analysis of the Court’s reliance on the traditional nuclear family to 
impose parental status on the basis of spousal status, see Brenda 
Cossman, “Parenting Beyond the Nuclear Family: Doe v. Alberta” 
(2007) 45:2 Alta L Rev 501.  
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and protection of his second parent was in his best interests. 
We would not wish to suggest that this conclusion can be 
generalized to other families. Clearly, children can thrive 
in a single-parent family, supported by friends, family, and 
public services. Certainly, courts should be careful not to 
favour heteronormative two-parent households, resisting 
the temptation to “find fathers” 10  for children where 
parenthood does not actually exist. This assessment must 
necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis. 
 
In Part III of the article, we describe Ontario’s new 
All Families are Equal Act,11  including restrictions that 
might have prevented our family from being recognized 
had our case been heard a few weeks later than it was. We 
argue that loving parental relationships can be created in a 
myriad of ways and that courts must have the ability to 
examine new family formations in keeping with changing 
social realities and to protect the best interests of children 
in unique situations. The emergence of new family forms 
involving same-sex couples and those who use 
reproductive technologies (among other permutations) has 
already disrupted centuries-old definitions of what it means 
to be a family. At the same time, the creation of new non-
normative families has opened up space for a recognition 
that the patriarchal nuclear family has never been the norm 
                                                        
10  Susan B Boyd et al, Autonomous Motherhood?: A Socio-Legal Study 
of Choice and Constraint (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015) 
at 30.  
11  An Act to amend the Children’s Law Reform Act, the Vital Statistics 
Act and various other Acts respecting parentage and related 
registrations, SO 2016, c 23 [All Families are Equal Act]. 
ARE YOU MY MOTHER? 
 
111 
in many socio-cultural communities. 12  Indeed, “[t]he 
traditional family structure remains significantly more 
prevalent among middle or upper class white 
individuals.”13 Thus, a legal regime that only recognizes 
traditional families will disadvantage vulnerable children, 
including racialized children and those with complex 
disabilities. Finally, in Part IV, we examine historical and 
contemporary examples of nonconjugal parenting. We 
argue that a child’s right to be loved must not be limited by 
his or her parents’ marital/cohabiting status, sexual 
relationship, or, indeed, when the parental relationship 
came into existence. We conclude that the state should 
support any and all relationships that have the capacity to 
further loving and happy homes for all children.  
 
PART I: LOVE MAKES A FAMILY (OUR STORY) 
 
We are both professors in the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Ottawa. We have been friends and colleagues 
for more than a decade, but we are not “spouses”14 or a 
same-sex couple.15 We do not cohabit together, although 
we do reside in vertically adjacent units in the same 
condominium. We have, since Elaan was a baby, co-
parented him. In some respects, we treat our two units as 
the upstairs and downstairs of a shared family home. In 
                                                        
12  See Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History: From Obedience to 
Intimacy or How Love Conquered Marriage (New York: Viking, 
2005) at 24–31.  
13 Jessica R Feinberg, “Friends as Co-Parents” (2009) 43:4 USF L Rev 
799 at 814. 
14  See Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F-3, s 1(1) [FLA]. 
15  See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 1, 3, 4; Collins Affidavit, 
supra note 4 at para 1. 
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other ways, we co-parent Elaan like any other parents who 
do not reside together.16 Our unique living situation defies 
easy categorization; some might call us sui generis, but we 
consider ourselves a family that shares unconditional love, 
trust, and consistent care as our foundation. 
 
Natasha made the decision in 2009 to become a 
single mother by choice,17 using anonymous donor sperm. 
Over the course of her pregnancy, Lynda offered to become 
Natasha’s birth coach.18 Lynda was present at Elaan’s birth 
and was the first person other than the surgeon to see him. 
We imagined that Lynda would be a significant person in 
Elaan’s life, but we did not intend, at that time, for her to 
become his parent.  
 
About six months after Elaan’s birth, it became 
clear that he was not meeting typical developmental 
milestones. After several tests, Elaan was diagnosed with 
periventricular leukomalacia,19 which eventually resulted 
                                                        
16  This may include separated or divorced couples who raise children 
together, multiple-parent families who agree in advance to raise 
children in different households, or some other family variation we 
have not thought of. In terms of our living arrangement, Elaan lives 
and sleeps in Natasha’s unit, but he often spends time in Lynda’s unit 
where some of his clothes, feeding supplies, toys, books, and adaptive 
equipment can also be found.  
17  See Boyd, supra note 10 at 14–15.  
18  See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 3, 5; Collins Affidavit, supra 
note 4 at para 5.  
19  “Periventricular leukomalacia (PVL) is a type of brain injury affecting 
infants. The condition involves the death of small areas of brain tissue 
around fluid-filled areas called ventricles. The damage creates ‘holes’ 
in the brain. ‘Leuko’ refers to the brain’s white matter. 
‘Periventricular’ refers to the area around the ventricles”: 
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in the more specific diagnoses of complex cerebral palsy, 
spastic quadriplegia, cortical visual impairment, asthma, 
epilepsy, acid reflux, and sleep apnea. Elaan is non-verbal, 
though his comprehension is very good. He communicates 
by using a head-operated switch device and by answering 
“yes” with his smile. He requires assistance with all 
activities of daily living including mobility, dressing, 
toileting, and eating. He is fed through a gastric tube and 
uses a variety of adaptive equipment including a 
wheelchair, a wheeled walker, a standing frame, and 
various types of specialized seating. He is a bright, joyful, 
and beautiful little boy who adores music, school, and the 
outdoors. Elaan needs 24-hour care and will continue to 
need such care for the rest of his life.20  
 
Very quickly following Elaan’s birth, Lynda’s role 
as an important “aunty” in his life turned to that of a daily 
caregiver alongside Natasha, her role increasing over time 
to the point where she became a second mother to him. 
Lynda is intimately involved in all areas of Elaan’s daily 
                                                        
“Periventricular Leukomalacia” Medline Plus (6 November 2017), 
online: <https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/007232.htm>.   
20  See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at para 25; Collins Affidavit, supra 
note 4 at para 11; Application for Declaration of Parentage, 
Collins/Bakht (Affidavit of Dr. Anne Rowan-Legg at paras 2–3) 
[Rowan-Legg Affidavit]. The enumeration of Elaan’s medical issues 
in this way can sound daunting and even reductionist. We are very 
conscious that Elaan is much more than a list of his medical diagnoses. 
As parents, we feel privileged to have his joyous spirit; he is teaching 
us so much about what is important in life. However, we needed the 
Court to understand the details of raising a child with multiple complex 
disabilities—and the increased caregiving responsibilities this 
involves—in order to make the case that having a second parent was in 
Elaan’s best interests. 
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life.21 When he was just a year old, Lynda sold her three-
bedroom house to move into Natasha’s condominium 
building so that she could help to raise Elaan more 
conveniently on a daily basis.22  
 
Lynda and Natasha share all child rearing, 
including day-to-day obligations relating to Elaan, such as 
feeding him, dressing him, bathing him, attending to his 
school work and social life, attending to his medical care 
and therapies, and all other regular and major aspects of 
child rearing.23 Lynda and Natasha, along with Elaan, eat 
meals and shop together, visit families and friends together, 
nurse Elaan’s hurts together, and plan for his future 
together. 24  We share in Elaan’s financial support 25  and 
coordinate our teaching schedules so that one of us is 
always available to care for Elaan should he be ill or have 
a doctor’s appointment. 26  Most importantly, Lynda and 
Elaan share a deep loving bond that is characteristic of a 
parental relationship. Though he cannot express his 
feelings verbally, Elaan’s responses and interactions 
demonstrate that he experiences Lynda as one of his 
parents. 27  Natasha also treats Lynda as a co-parent, 
                                                        
21 See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 18–23; Collins Affidavit, 
supra note 4 at paras 3, 9, 13, 16. 
22  See Collins Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 14, 19–20. 
23  See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 24–36; Ibid at paras 20–29. 
24  See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at para 17; Collins Affidavit, supra 
note 4 at paras 16, 20, 63.  
25  See Collins Affidavit, supra note 4 at paras 61–63.  
26  See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4 at para 43. 
27  See ibid at paras 23, 38.  
ARE YOU MY MOTHER? 
 
115 
involving her in all aspects of decision making regarding 
Elaan’s medical care, nutrition, schooling, recreation, and 
therapies.28  
 
Eventually, we sought to have our de facto 
parenting arrangement recognized in law. This was 
important to us for a number of reasons. For Natasha, it was 
about peace of mind. Given Elaan’s specialized needs for 
care and support, which will only increase as he grows 
older, knowing that Elaan had another legal parent to rely 
on was reassuring. Having Lynda as a second parent would 
ensure that Elaan would be eligible for her medical 
insurance benefits and the disabled dependents provisions 
of her pension, that he could inherit on intestacy, and that 
he would have another person legally required to meet his 
needs physically, emotionally, spiritually, and 
financially.29 “For Lynda, it was about being able to say to 
doctors and teachers (and anyone who would listen!) ‘this 
is my son!’”30 But a formal recognition of her parentage 
would also ensure that Lynda could consent to medical 
treatment, register Elaan in school, claim him as a 
dependent for any tax purposes, and make decisions 
regarding his education and moral upbringing. Without the 
formal recognition of her parentage, if any authority were 
to question Lynda’s legal relationship to Elaan, she would 
have none other than that of a “babysitter”. We also felt it 
was important to honour the relationship that had grown so 
organically between Lynda and Elaan and to 
                                                        
28  See ibid at paras 2, 17–18, 37–45; Collins Affidavit, supra note 4 at 
paras 57–58. 
29  See A(A) v B(B), 2007 ONCA 2 at para 14, 83 OR (3d) 561. 
30  Collins & Bakht, supra note 3.  
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simultaneously challenge the historic hegemony of 
marriage and “one-size-fits-all models of parenting.”31 
 
PART II: A FAMILY MAKES LAW 
 
In April 2016, we filed an application32 with the 
Superior Court of Justice, Family Court, seeking a 
declaration of parentage for Lynda.33 We filed affidavits34 
outlining our position that Elaan’s best interests would be 
served with legal recognition of Lynda’s role in his life. 
Our Application was filed as a “basket motion” (or 
unopposed motion) and thus, we were not required—
though we were prepared—to submit a factum. We would 
have argued that the Court should use its inherent parens 
                                                        
31  Ibid. 
32  We sought an application for a declaration of parentage pursuant to 
section 4 of the CLRA, supra note 8. Section 4 of the CLRA states: 
“Any person having an interest may apply to a court for a declaration 
that a male person is recognized in law to be the father of a child or 
that a female person is the mother of a child” (ibid). However, because 
the CLRA was interpreted to permit a child to have only one male 
parent and one female parent (see Rutherford v Ontario (Deputy 
Registrar General) (2006), 81 OR (3d) 81 at para 102, 270 DLR (4th) 
90 (Ont Sup Ct) [Rutherford v Ontario]; A(A) v B(B), supra note 29 at 
para 34), we were, in fact, asking the Court to invoke its parens patriae 
jurisdiction to fulfill our request. 
33  We also sought an order for joint custodial rights of Elaan with respect 
to major decisions about his care and upbringing under the CLRA 
(recognizing that this alone would not accurately reflect Lynda’s true 
role in Elaan’s life as his mother) and an order amending Elaan’s birth 
certificate under the Vital Statistics Act, RSO 1990, c V 4, to show both 
Natasha Bakht and Lynda Collins as parents of Elaan. See Application 
for Declaration of Parentage, Collins/Bakht, supra note 4 at paras 1–
4.  
34  See Bakht Affidavit, supra note 4; Collins Affidavit, supra note 4. 
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patriae jurisdiction to grant the declaration because: (a) it 
would be in Elaan’s best interests to do so; (b) there was a 
legislative gap in the Children’s Law Reform Act; and (c) 
nonconjugality is not a legal impediment to the proposed 
declaration.  
 
(A) ELAAN’S BEST INTERESTS  
 
In our application and draft factum, we argued that it was 
in Elaan’s best interests to have Lynda’s role as his parent 
legally recognized through a declaration of parentage. 
Because his needs for care and support are profound, and 
because as he gets older, meeting his needs physically, 
emotionally, and financially will become even more 
challenging, having two legal parents would be a 
significant benefit to him. 
 
The Child and Family Services Act 35  precluded 
Lynda from adopting Elaan because she is not a 
“relative”36 by blood or marriage. Natasha would have had 
to give up her parental rights to Elaan in order for Lynda to 
adopt him, which was not what we wanted. We were also 
unable to make use of the simplified step-parent adoption 
route as we were not in a conjugal relationship.37 The fact 
that marital status was the only hurdle preventing us from 
accessing the step-parent adoption provisions in the CFSA 
is discriminatory and almost certainly unconstitutional, but 
                                                        
35  RSO 1990, c C 11 [CFSA]. 
36  See ibid, ss 3(1), 141(8). 
37  See ibid, s 158(2)(b). See also Shelley AM Gavigan, “Legal Forms, 
Family Forms, Gendered Norms: What Is a Spouse?” (1999) 14:1 
CJLS 127 at 156. 
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we opted not to pursue this legal route. Because the future 
care of a child with disabilities like Elaan’s is exorbitantly 
expensive,38 we felt it would be financially irresponsible to 
spend the amount of money needed to constitutionally 
challenge the legislation.39 A declaration of parentage, as 
the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in A.(A.) v. B.(B.), 
“provides practical and symbolic recognition of the parent-
child relationship”, 40  conferring the same rights and 
obligations as those of biological or adoptive parents.41   
 
As in A.(A.) v. B.(B.), 42  we believe it was 
significant that Natasha, Elaan’s biological parent, 
supported the application for the declaration of parentage.43 
                                                        
38  See Donna Anderson et al, “The Personal Costs of Caring for a Child 
with a Disability: A Review of the Literature” (2007) 122:1 Public 
Health Reports 3 at 7. 
39 See “How Much Does a Family Lawyer Cost?”, Fine & Associates 
(blog), online: <www.torontodivorcelaw.com/family-lawyer-cost/>. 
40  Supra note 29 at para 15. 
41  In particular, a declaration of parentage: confers “all the rights and 
obligations of a custodial parent”; “determines lineage”; “is a lifelong 
immutable declaration of status”; “allows the parent to fully participate 
in the child’s life”; “ensures that the child will inherit on intestacy”; 
allows the declared parent to “obtain an OHIP [Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan] card, a social insurance number, airline tickets and 
passports for the child”; allows the declared parent to “register the child 
in school”; would require the declared parent’s consent for any future 
adoption; and allows the declared parent to “assert her rights under 
various laws, such as the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, 
c. 2, Sched. A.”: ibid at para 14.  
42  See supra note 29 at paras 4, 14. 
43  In DLC v GES, 2006 SKCA 79 at para 61, 270 DLR (4th) 597, the 
Court articulated “a deep social and legal norm which presumes that fit 
parents generally act in their children’s best interests.” As the Court 
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However, we are not of the view that this should be 
determinative. In our case, Natasha’s support of the 
application showed that a loving and capable parent and the 
person who knows Elaan best also trusted the applicant to 
care for her child like a parent. The ultimate question, 
however, ought to be whether a declaration of parentage is 
in the child’s best interests.44 This might include an inquiry 
into whether the parent seeking the declaration has a 
parental relationship with the child, whether there is love 
and affection between the child and the applicant parent, 
the length of time that the parent-like relationship has 
existed, the ability and willingness of the proposed parent 
to provide for the child, the child’s preferences, if 
ascertainable,45 and the relationship between the legally-
                                                        
noted, “[i]t also reflects a fundamental corollary view that a fit parent’s 
assessment of a child’s best interests should not be lightly interfered 
with” (ibid).  
44  Because human relationships are multifaceted, complicated, and 
dynamic, there should be no presumption that a specific relationship 
between an adult and a child does not give rise to the possibility of the 
adult being found to be a parent. The appropriate approach is to closely 
examine the realities of the relationship and all of its circumstances. 
We believe, however, that the custodial parent’s views should be given 
very substantial weight and careful consideration in determining the 
best interests of the child. As the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal noted 
in DLC v GES, “[s]ingle parents, in particular, often need assistance 
from friends and others in caring for their children. Those caregivers 
will frequently develop a strong attachment to the children and vice 
versa.  But . . . it would be a serious overstep to impose court-
sanctioned visiting rights as a consequence of such relationships”: ibid 
at para 65. 
45  These indicia of a parental relationship are comparable to section 24(2) 
of the CLRA, supra note 8, which directs judges hearing custody or 
access applications to consider the needs and circumstances of the 
child. 
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recognized parent and the applicant parent.46 This would 
be a context-dependent, fact-specific inquiry that puts the 
child’s interests first. Importantly, a best interests inquiry 
must not import questionable biases such as a desire for 
children to be raised in an environment that most closely 
resembles the traditional heteronormative family. Because 
the courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction is fundamentally 
about protecting the interests of vulnerable children, it 
allows courts to craft individualized remedies for unique 
situations.  
 
In our case, to establish that it was in Elaan’s best 
interests to have Lynda declared a parent, we gathered 
affidavits from friends, family members, and Elaan’s 
professional caregivers to testify to the vital parental role 
that Lynda plays in Elaan’s life, and that the family is 
healthy, happy, and functioning well. Elaan’s paediatrician 
since 2012, Dr. Anne Rowan-Legg, who observed Lynda 
and Elaan on multiple occasions in both clinic and hospital 
settings, stated in her affidavit: 
 
                                                        
46  With respect to this final criterion, if the relationship between the 
legally-recognized parent and the applicant parent is particularly 
antagonistic, it may well not be in the best interests of the child for the 
declaration of parentage to be granted. For example, in Buist v Greaves, 
the Court denied an application for declaration of parentage where the 
biological mother opposed it and there was a high “level of suspicion, 
misunderstanding and difficulty . . . permeat[ing] the current 
relationship” between the parties: [1997] OJ No 2646 at 10, 11 OFLR 
3 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)). In that case, the child did not consider the 
Applicant his mother and the Applicant had drafted and commissioned 
an affidavit confirming the biological mother was the child’s sole 
parent (see ibid at 16–17). 
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[Lynda] presents as a responsible and loving 
parental figure for Elaan . . . I have had the 
opportunity to care for many children with 
complex medical needs. . . .  I feel that I can, 
through this professional role, attest to some 
of the specific qualities of parents that are 
able to care for children with special needs. 
The role takes incredible patience, 
commitment, creativity (to troubleshoot 
difficult situations), unflappability, 
optimism, confidence, and deep love. I have 
seen all of these qualities, amongst many 
others, in both Lynda and Natasha. They are 
remarkable individuals, and an even stronger 
team. . . . 
 
Given Elaan’s complex medical needs, and 
the joy he clearly derives from his close bond 
with Lynda, I believe that it is in Elaan’s best 
interests that Lynda be recognized as his legal 
parent. This will give Lynda the opportunity 
to participate fully in medical decision-
making for Elaan, and will ensure that Elaan 
enjoys the physical, financial and 
psychological support of two legal parents.47 
 
Like Dr. Rowan-Legg, Anne Levesque, a disability 
rights lawyer and friend of the Bakht-Collins family, also 
observed that Lynda and Natasha form a strong parental 
unit for this uniquely vulnerable child.  Ms. Levesque 
noted: 
 
                                                        
47  Rowan-Legg Affidavit, supra note 20 at paras 4, 8, 10. 
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As a human rights lawyer, I have served as a 
member and chair of the Human Rights 
Committee of the Council of Canadians with 
Disabilities—Canada’s largest disability 
rights and advocacy group—for nearly a 
decade. Based on my experience, two of the 
greatest barriers facing persons with 
disabilities in Canada are poverty and social 
exclusion. In my view, Lynda’s Application 
for a Declaration of Parentage, if granted, 
will help Elaan overcome these two 
important barriers.48  
 
Finally, the evidence of Leslie Walker, Principal of 
Elaan’s school at the Ottawa Children’s Treatment Centre, 
was also strongly supportive of the Application. Ms. 
Walker stated: 
 
Having observed hundreds of families during 
my years in special needs education, I would 
say that Lynda, Natasha and Elaan present as 
a loving and effective family unit. Lynda is 
clearly intimately involved with every aspect 
of Elaan’s life and she demonstrates an 
obvious interest in and dedication to his 
education. Lynda works actively with our 
team to maximize Elaan’s progress and 
wellbeing and is clearly committed to him as 
a parent. Elaan in turn clearly derives joy, 
                                                        
48  Application for Declaration of Parentage, Collins/Bakht (Affidavit of 
Anne Levesque at paras 5, 10). 
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love and a sense of security from Lynda’s 
presence in his life.49 
 
Parents of children with complex disabilities face 
significant risks of caregiver burn-out and physical injury 
throughout the lifetime of their children.50 By granting the 
declaration, we argued that the Court would be serving 
Elaan’s best interests, both directly and indirectly, by 
providing an additional level of legal security and 
assurance to his biological parent. Parents of children with 
complex disabilities are often particularly in need of 
support because of the dramatic financial and emotional 
impact of raising and supporting these kids in a society that 
is not responsive to their various needs. In such a context, 
state support is clearly critical to ensure that both the 
caregiver and the child are given the assistance needed to 
thrive. 51  However, recognizing more parents can also 
introduce the potential for creating more financial 
                                                        
49  Application for Declaration of Parentage, Collins/Bakht (Affidavit of 
Leslie Walker at paras 8–9). 
50  See generally NA Murphy et al, “The Health of Caregivers for 
Children with Disabilities: Caregiver Perspectives” (2006) 33:2 Child 
180, online: Pub Med <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17291322>. 
See also S Matthew Liao, The Right to Be Loved (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015) at 138–139, who argues that “the duty to 
promote a child’s being loved gives us further reasons to promote the 
primary dutybearers’ welfare, health, psychological well-being, and so 
on, through generous welfare policies.” 
51  See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, “Chalimony: Seeking Equity between 
Parents of Children with Disabilities and Chronic Illnesses” (2010) 
34:2 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 253 at 254–255. See also Christine 
Dobby, “Whose Responsibility? Disabled Adult ‘Children of the 
Marriage’ under the Divorce Act and the Canadian Social Welfare 
State” (2005) 20 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 41. 
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support,52 more hands-on care, and more comfort, which 
will tend to be in a child’s best interests. 
 
Elaan revels in playing and spending time with his 
family. He recognizes Lynda as his parent and knows he 
can depend on her to care for him. Though the legal 
declaration would make no practical difference to our daily 
lived reality from Elaan’s perspective, we took the position 
that it was in his best interests to have Lynda’s role as his 
parent legally recognized. It was important for “law to 
catch up with life”.53  
 
(B) FILLING THE LEGISLATIVE GAP IN THE 
CLRA 
 
It is well established that courts may exercise their parens 
patriae jurisdiction to fill a legislative gap, including in the 
context of declarations of parentage. 54  In this case, a 
surprising gap in the CLRA allowed the Court to invoke 
parens patriae. Despite more than two decades of Charter 
jurisprudence on same-sex family rights, the CLRA did not 
allow the issuance of a declaration of parentage where it 
would result in a child having two mothers or two fathers.55 
This anomaly was patently inconsistent with contemporary 
Canadian values and Charter jurisprudence, and 
                                                        
52  “In contrast to many traditional families where only one parent 
contributes financially to the household,” two friends may provide 
greater economic stability to a child where the family consists of “two 
financially independent individuals”: Feinberg, supra note 13 at 815.  
53  E-mail from Angela Cameron to Natasha Bakht and Lynda Collins (17 
November 2016). 
54  See A(A) v B(B), supra note 29 at para 7. 
55  See Rutherford v Ontario, supra note 32 at para 102. 
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demonstrated the existence of a legislative gap in the 
statute. As the Court of Appeal held in A.(A.) v. B.(B.): 
 
The purpose of the legislation was to declare 
that all children should have equal status. At 
the time, equality of status meant recognizing 
the equality of children born inside and 
outside of marriage. The legislature had in 
mind traditional unions between one mother 
and one father. It did not legislate in relation 
to other types of relationships because those 
relationships and the advent of reproductive 
technology were beyond the vision of the 
Law Reform Commission and the legislature 
of the day.56 
 
Similarly, the social and technological 
developments that lead two female friends to raise a child 
together were not contemplated by the legislature in 
drafting the CLRA. The CLRA was intended to promote the 
equality of all children but failed to keep pace with changes 
in society. The Court of Appeal explained: 
 
Present social conditions and attitudes have 
changed. Advances in our appreciation of the 
value of other types of relationships and in 
the science of reproductive technology have 
created gaps in the CLRA’s legislative 
scheme. Because of these changes the parents 
of a child can be two women or two men. 
They are as much the child’s parents as 
adopting parents or “natural” parents. The 
                                                        
56  Supra note 29 at para 34.  
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CLRA, however, does not recognize these 
forms of parenting and thus the children of 
these relationships are deprived of the 
equality of status that declarations of 
parentage provide.57 
 
Following the lead of the litigants in A.(A.) v. 
B.(B.), we sought a declaration of parentage under the 
CLRA, knowing that (as in that case) the Court would likely 
decline because of the clear precedent stating that the 
CLRA precluded such a declaration when it would result in 
a child having two mothers. We then expected the Court, 
as it did in A.(A.) v. B.(B.), to resort to its parens patriae 
jurisdiction to fill this obvious gap in the legislative 
scheme. Since the Court’s order actually issued the 
declaration pursuant to the CLRA and there were no 
reasons provided in our case, 58  the use of the parens 
patriae jurisdiction remains unclear in our case.  
 
However, even if there was no legislative gap in the 
CLRA, in our view, the Court would be justified in 
exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction in order to fulfill 
the Act’s paramount objective. 59  Without the Court’s 
intervention, the legislation actually becomes self-
defeating, undermining rather than promoting Elaan’s 
                                                        
57  Ibid at para 35. 
58  The court order states: “Lynda Margaret Collins is a parent of the child, 
Elaan Das Bakht, born February 9, 2010 and that Lynda Margaret 
Collins shall be recognized in law as a parent of Elaan Das Bakht 
pursuant to section 4 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.” 
59  In A(A) v B(B), supra note 29 at para 20, the Court of Appeal said the 
purpose of the CLRA was to declare that all children should have equal 
status. 
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equality and best interests. Here, the legislative gap was 
clear and had already been elucidated by the Court of 
Appeal in A.(A.) v. B.(B.).60  
 
(C) NONCONJUGALITY IS NOT A LEGAL 
IMPEDIMENT TO A DECLARATION OF 
PARENTAGE  
 
Finally, our draft factum argued that nothing in the CLRA 
or the jurisprudence prevents the court from issuing a 
declaration of parentage in a nonconjugal context. The 
CLRA permits courts to recognize nonbiological or social 
parents where the parent-child relationship has been 
established on a balance of probabilities.61 As the court 
held in A.W.M. v. T.N.S.: “In these changing times, court 
decisions on [declarations of] parentage focus less on the 
biological connection between child and parent and more 
on the substance of the relationship.” 62  Moreover, “the 
declaration made . . . is not that the applicant is a child’s 
natural parent, but that he or she is recognized in law to be 
the father or mother of the child.”63 
 
In Low v. Low,64 for example, the Court granted a 
declaration of parentage to the nonbiological father of a 
child born through artificial insemination, though the 
applicant’s marriage to the child’s mother had broken 
down some four years before the judgment. Similarly, in 
                                                        
60  See ibid at paras 38–40. 
61  See supra note 8, s 13(3). 
62  2014 ONSC 5420 at para 24, 54 RFL (7th) 155. 
63  A(A) v B(B), supra note 29 at para 32. 
64  (1994), 114 DLR (4th) 709, 4 RFL (4th) 103 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)).  
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D.W.H. v. D.J.R.,65 the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
granted a declaration of parentage to the gay, nonbiological 
father of a child, where the applicant had never been in a 
conjugal relationship with the child’s lesbian mother and 
was no longer in a conjugal relationship with the child’s 
biological father. The Court held that “[i]t [was] contrary 
to the best interests of the child S. to be limited to the legal 
recognition of a sole parent”.66 The trial Court in A.(A.) v. 
B.(B.) noted that “[r]ecognition of parentage under the 
CLRA does not depend upon marital status.”67  
 
In the recent case of B.C.P. and L.P. v. A.R.P.,68 
Justice Kiteley aptly observed: 
 
Having heard many applications for 
declarations of parentage, these cases reflect 
the diversity of circumstances that are 
presented. . . . where a single person (without 
a domestic partner) is impregnated using 
[Assisted Reproductive Technologies] . . . 
and other permutations and combinations in 
the straight and LGBTQ communities.69 
 
Here, the Court clearly recognized the wide number 
of situations that may lead to declarations of parentage 
being sought, suggesting courts’ openness to alternative 
parenting arrangements in the face of a changing society.  
                                                        
65  2011 ABQB 608, aff’d 2013 ABCA 240, 364 DLR (4th) 420. 
66  Ibid at para 139. 
67  (2003), 225 DLR (4th) 371 at para 16, 38 RFL (5th) 1 (Ont Sup Ct). 
68  2016 ONSC 4518, 87 RFL (7th) 219. 
69  Ibid at para 8 [emphasis added]. 
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For all practical purposes, Lynda and Natasha are 
in an analogous position to ex-spouses who are functioning 
effectively in co-parenting their child. The fact that a 
conjugal union never existed between us is immaterial to 
the best interests of Elaan—the raison d’être of the CLRA. 
“A person’s ability to love and offer emotional support to 
a child depends on his or her personality traits (such as 
empathy, sympathy, understanding, and kindness) and has 
no logical connection to that individual’s marital or 
relationship status.”70 Indeed an analysis that focuses on 
the conjugal (or nonconjugal) nature of the relationship 
between the parents and fails to focus on each parent’s 
relationship with the child and their ability to co-parent 
simply misses the mark.  
 
In terms of parenting ability, there is no logical 
reason to privilege sexual connections over all others. In 
fact, to do so would be to fail to offer much needed support 
to more vulnerable families, particularly those raising 
children with disabilities. An insistence on conjugality also 
disregards and discourages the myriad ways in which 
people exchange love and care.71 If law is to remain neutral 
among the various visions of the good life,72 it must be 
open to alternative family formations while remaining ever 
vigilant of a child’s best interests. The Law Commission of 
Canada presciently argued in its report, Beyond 
                                                        
70  Feinberg, supra note 13 at 815.  
71  See Nicole Civita, “Cauldrons for Intimacy and Conduits of Care: The 
Forms and Functions of Post-Marriage Families” (JD Paper, 
Georgetown Law, 2007) [unpublished]. 
72  See Milton C Regan Jr, Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy (New 
York: NYU Press, 1993) at 122, cited in Civita, ibid. 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 
 
130 
Conjugality, 73  that individuals must be accorded the 
maximum freedom to determine the relationships that 
matter to them. “The state ought to support any and all 
relationships that have the capacity to further relevant 
social goals, and to remain neutral with respect to 
individuals’ choice of a particular form or status.”74 
 
Ultimately, the Court was convinced that it was in 
Elaan’s best interests to have Lynda as a second parent and 
we received an order on November 7, 2016 formally 
declaring Lynda to be a parent of Elaan.75  
 
PART III: ALL FAMILIES ARE EQUAL* (*MAY 
NOT APPLY TO SOME FAMILIES) 
 
Our legal victory was sweet, but in some ways short-lived. 
While we personally received the result we needed, on 
                                                        
73  Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and 
Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships (Ottawa: Law 
Commission of Canada, 21 December 2001) at 18 [Beyond 
Conjugality]. 
74  Ibid. See also Judith Stacy, “Toward Equal Regard for Marriages and 
Other Imperfect Intimate Affiliations” (2003) 32:1 Hofstra L Rev 331. 
75  The Court did not provide any reasons for its decision. Thus, our case 
is not available on any legal database. We were simply given an order 
that “Lynda Margaret Collins is a parent of the child, Elaan Das Bakht. 
. . and that [she] shall be recognized in law as a parent of Elaan Das 
Bakht pursuant to section 4 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.” Lynda 
also received joint custodial rights together with Natasha regarding 
major decisions about the care and upbringing of Elaan. The Deputy 
Registrar General for the Province of Ontario was directed to amend 
Elaan’s birth certificate to add Lynda as a parent pursuant to section 2 
of Regulation 1094 under the Vital Statistics Act. See Vital Statistics 
Act, RRO 1990, Reg 1094, s 2. 
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December 5, 2016, the All Families are Equal Act received 
royal assent. 76  The Honourable Yasir Naqvi, Attorney 
General of Ontario, introduced the AFEA, explaining its 
goal of treating all children equally and ending the 
uncertainty parents face when their children are conceived 
using assisted reproductive technologies. The AFEA 
developed out of an earlier private member’s bill, which 
never passed.77 The new Act, which made amendments to 
the Children’s Law Reform Act, the Vital Statistics Act and 
thirty-nine other statutes in Ontario, sought to address 
several issues, including rules regarding the use and 
reimbursement of surrogates,78 pre-conception parentage 
agreements, and was the first overhaul of antiquated 
parentage laws in the province since 1978.  
 
The intention of the legislation is certainly 
progressive in that it attempts to dismantle the historically 
presumed connection between biology and parentage and 
recognizes to some extent that families may take different 
forms. The new legislation is particularly significant in 
providing clarity and certainty to LGBTQ parents who 
conceive through assisted reproduction. 79  The AFEA 
provides that the parents of a child conceived through 
                                                        
76  Bill 28, All Families Are Equal Act (Parentage and Related 
Registrations Statute Law Amendment), 2nd Sess, 41st Leg, Ontario, 
2016 (assented to 5 December 2016), SO 2016, c 23 [AFEA]. 
77  Bill 137, Cy and Ruby’s Act (Parental Recognition),1st Sess, 41st Parl, 
Ontario, 2015 (referred to the Standing Committee on Regulations and 
Private Bills 10 December 2015). 
78  The scope of this paper does not allow an examination of these 
provisions.  
79  Assisted reproduction under AFEA “means a method of conceiving 
other than by sexual intercourse”: AFEA, supra note 76, s 1(1).  
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assisted reproduction are the birth parent and the birth 
parent’s partner, if any, at the time of the child’s 
conception. 80  This eliminates the need for the non-
biological parent to go to court to have his or her parental 
status recognized in law using a declaration of parentage. 
It also settles in advance the legal relationship of donors of 
genetic material with respect to children born through 
assisted reproduction. The AFEA also permits multiple 
parents, up to four people, to be recognized without a court 
order, if all parties entered into a written pre-conception 
agreement to be parents of the child together.81  
 
The new legislation is forward-looking in 
recognizing that alternative families exist, permitting 
parentage more easily in the context of conjugal same-sex 
couples, nonconjugal parents and multiple-parent families. 
However, while the purpose of the AFEA was to “create a 
bill that puts what’s best for kids first—having a loving 
family”, 82  ironically, the AFEA may foreclose the 
possibility of courts exercising their parens patriae 
jurisdiction to recognize certain non-normative families. 
 
                                                        
80  Ibid, s 8(1). 
81  The birth parent is required to be one of the parties to this pre-
conception agreement: ibid, s 9(2)(b). Section 9(4) of AFEA, ibid, 
confirms that on the birth of a child contemplated by a pre-conception 
parentage agreement, the parties to the agreement shall be recognized 
in law to be parents of the child.   
82  Ministry of the Attorney General, “About the All Families are Equal 
Act, 2016”, (29 November 2016), online: 
<https://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2016/11/about-the-all-families-are-
equal-act-2016.html>. 
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Under the AFEA, putative parents must form the 
intention to parent before the child’s conception and that 
intention must be formalized in a pre-conception 
agreement. This requirement is coherent when one 
considers that LGBT parents generally plan the birth of 
their children and need to ensure certainty in this planning 
process. But, the intention to parent pre-conception is not 
the only way to ensure that children’s interests are put first. 
Loving families can be and are created after a child’s birth. 
Indeed, this is what step-parents, and those who “stand in 
the place of a parent” as it is understood in the context of 
child support, do regularly.83  
 
Yet the AFEA specifically restricts the granting of 
a declaration of parentage in certain situations. 
Specifically, section 13(4) of the CLRA states that a court 
shall not issue a declaration of parentage where:  
 
1. A declaration of parentage. . . results in the 
child having more than two parents;  
2. A declaration of parentage. . . results in the 
child having as a parent one other person, 
in addition to his or her birth parent, if that 
person is not a parent of the child under 
section 7, 8 or 9 [who is not otherwise a 
parent biologically, through a pre-
conception parentage agreement, or by 
virtue of being the spouse of a birth parent 
where assisted reproduction is used].84 
                                                        
83  CFSA, supra note 35, s 158(2)(b). See also FLA, supra note 14, ss 1(1), 
31; Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 147(4) [FLA (BC)]; Divorce 
Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 2(2)(b). 
84  AFEA, supra note 76, s 13(4) [emphasis added].  
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Section 13(5) establishes the following 
prerequisites for a declaration of parentage in the above 
context:  
 
1. The application for the declaration is made 
on or before the first anniversary of the 
child’s birth, unless the court orders 
otherwise. 
2. Every other person who is a parent of the 
child is a party to the application. 
3. There is evidence that, before the child was 
conceived, every parent of the child and 
every person in respect of whom a 
declaration of parentage respecting that 
child is sought under the application 
intended to be, together, parents of the 
child. 
4. The declaration is in the best interests of 
the child.85  
 
In other words, these provisions preclude a 
declaration of parentage where the intention to parent 
arises after a child’s birth, even where such a declaration 
may be in the child’s best interests.  
 
The courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction is an 
inherent power, arguably protected under section 96 of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that courts have 
an obligation to exercise it where necessary to protect the 
best interests of children.86 However, the AFEA appears to 
                                                        
85  Ibid, s 13(5). 
86  Beson v Director of Child Welfare (Nfld), [1982] 2 SCR 716 at 724, 30 
RFL (2d) 438. 
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at least attempt to fetter judicial discretion in this regard.  
Section 3 states that the Act determines “parentage for all 
purposes of the law of Ontario”87 and section 13(4) states 
that a court “shall not issue a declaration of parentage”88 in 
certain enumerated circumstances. This unusual step 
appears to be an attempt to preclude the issuance of a 
declaration of parentage under the parens patriae 
jurisdiction. If so, the provision is perhaps open to 
constitutional challenge, or may be ignored by judges who 
are confident in their inherent power to make rulings based 
on the parens patriae jurisdiction. Only time will tell. 
 
An examination of the Hansard for the AFEA 
reveals that some legislators were concerned about the 
intention to parent restrictions placed on declarations of 
parentage. The Honourable Cheri DiNovo disagreed with 
the condition requiring the intention to parent to be 
formalized prior to conception or before a child’s first 
birthday, rather than allowing the best interests of the child 
to govern. 89  The Honourable Catherine Fife expressed 
similar concerns, noting that these provisions would 
prevent third and fourth parents from being recognized90 
where such parents formed the intention to parent after the 
                                                        
87  AFEA, supra note 76, s 3. 
88  Ibid, s 13(4). 
89  Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of the Debates 
(Hansard), 41st Leg, 2nd Sess, No 11 (3 October 2016) at 1450 (Hon 
Cheri DiNovo). 
90  Ibid at 1540 (Hon Catherine Fife). The AFEA restricts the number of 
parents to four where a pre-conception agreement is entered into. This 
statutory limit on the number of parents is somewhat arbitrary.   
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child’s birth. 91  The fact that these concerns were 
contemplated by the legislature suggests that people who 
are excluded from the AFEA by virtue of forming the intent 
to parent after the child’s birth may not be able to use the 
courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction. It would be very 
difficult to establish a legislative gap where the debates 
disclose that the legislature foresaw and considered such a 
situation and deliberately decided to exclude such people 
from parentage declarations.  
 
While courts have noted that the existence of a 
legislative gap is not the only justification for exercising 
parens patriae jurisdiction, this is not a well-developed 
area in the context of declarations of parentage. 92  The 
possibility that section 97 of the Courts of Justice Act93 
                                                        
91  The AFEA is faithful to the letter of the legal precedent set in A(A) v 
B(B), supra note 29 that a child may legally have three parents and 
perhaps even furthers the multiple parent scenario by permitting up to 
four parents who are parties to a pre-conception agreement. However, 
being faithful to the spirit of multiple parent families must also 
recognize that such families may be created in more ways than one 
(other than through an agreement pre-birth).  
92  In CR v Children's Aid Society of Hamilton (2004), 8 RFL (6th) 285 at 
para 125, Czutrin J held that the parens patriae jurisdiction does not 
depend upon a legislative gap if the exercise of that jurisdiction is the 
only way to meet the paramount objective of legislation. In that case, 
the relevant legislation was the Child and Family Services Act, which 
articulates the promotion of “the best interests, protection and well 
being of children” as the paramount purpose of the Act: supra note 35, 
s 1(1). While there is no “paramount objective” specifically articulated 
in the CLRA as it pertains to declarations of parentage, in A(A) v B(B), 
supra note 29, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that the purpose of 
the CLRA was to declare that all children should have equal status. 
93  Section 97 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43, states: “The 
Court of Appeal and the Superior Court of Justice, exclusive of the 
ARE YOU MY MOTHER? 
 
137 
could be used to make a binding declaration of right has to 
date only proven useful to people seeking negative 
declarations of parentage. 94  The only other avenue 
available for such parent applicants would be a costly and 
burdensome constitutional challenge to the AFEA.  
 
A more flexible approach to declarations of 
parentage would have been prudent, given family forms are 
not set in stone, but constantly evolving. In British 
Columbia, section 31 of the Family Law Act permits courts 
to issue declarations of parentage “if there is a dispute or 
any uncertainty as to whether a person is or is not a parent 
under this Part”.95 This section of the FLA appears to leave 
open the possibility that courts might grant declarations of 
parentage in situations outside of those contemplated 
explicitly under the Act or where there is a dispute about 
who the parents are. Such a residual provision in Ontario 
would have avoided excluding some families from an Act 
that claims to be about the equality of all families.  
 
It is hard to understand the reasons for the timing 
restrictions on declarations of parentage in the AFEA as 
none were alluded to in the legislative debates. Perhaps the 
statutory limits were implemented to appease opponents 
concerned about floodgates or to protect the autonomy of 
intended parents from future interference, by drawing a 
                                                        
Small Claims Court, may make binding declarations of right, whether 
or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed.” 
94  In JR v LH (2002), 117 ACWS (3d) 276 (Ont Sup Ct J), Justice Kiteley 
used section 97 of the Courts of Justice Act, ibid, to declare that the 
gestational carrier or surrogate, who was not biologically related to the 
twin children, and her husband were not parents of the children. 
95  FLA (BC), supra note 83, s 31. 
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legislative “bright line”. But the case law does not suggest 
a stampede of adults seeking to parent children where they 
are not obliged to do so. In fact, the reverse is true. Many 
family law cases are about people trying to avoid their 
parental duties, whether in the context of child support or 
missed access visits.96 Even if people were clamoring to 
parent children who already have parents, we are not 
convinced this is necessarily a problem. An appropriate 
feminist application of the best interests of the child 
principle ought to be able to guide judicial decisions in 
such cases. In some instances, excluding a putative second 
(or subsequent) parent might serve both the best interests 
of the child and maternal autonomy. In others, recognizing 
an additional parent might improve the lives of both 
mothers and children; in all cases, the custodial parent’s 
views should be given very substantial weight and careful 
consideration. 
 
Though the AFEA was generally ameliorative 
legislation, it was retrogressive in its restriction of the 
Court’s ability to protect the best interests of a child on a 
case-by-case basis where parentage might arise after birth. 
The timing around when a parental relationship is created 
is not a sound indicator of whether a particular relationship 
is important to the best interests of a particular child. And 
in the context of raising children with disabilities, a 
situation that is typically only known after a child’s birth, 
it may undermine efforts by people willing to create 
atypical families in order to pool resources and care, to 
                                                        
96  See Fair v Fair, 2012 ONCA 900; Collins v Colling, 2017 ONSC 
2232; Punzo v Punzo, 2016 ONCA 957, 90 RFL (7th) 304. 
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raise these children in supportive, healthy, loving, and 
flourishing environments.97   
 
PART IV: NONCONJUGAL CO-PARENTING: 
REVOLUTIONARY OR EVOLUTIONARY? 
 
Numerous international and domestic legal instruments 
delineate the rights of children to grow up in a loving 
family.98 The right of children to be loved has also been 
explored by philosopher S. Matthew Liao, who argues 
“every able person in appropriate circumstances has a duty 
to promote a child’s being loved even when the biological 
                                                        
97  For a similar argument in the adoption context in the United States see 
Feinberg, supra note 13 at 802: “[S]ingle individuals whom the state 
deems eligible to adopt on their own, but who choose not to because of 
the great difficulties inherent in raising a child alone, may adopt if 
allowed to do so jointly with a close friend.”   
98  For example, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child 
states: “The child, for the full and harmonious development of his 
personality, needs love and understanding. He shall, wherever 
possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, 
and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection” United Nations, 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, GA Res 1386(XIV), UNGAOR, 
14th Sess, Supp No 16, UN Doc A/4354 (1959) 19 at 20. The 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child in Israel (1989) describes every 
child as having “the rights to a family life—to nourishment, suitable 
housing, protection, love and understanding”: Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child in Israel, 1989, online: 
<http://cms.education.gov.il/EducationCMS/Units/Pniyot/KavPatuah/
ZhuyotTalmid/ZahuyotEladimIsrael.html>, cited in Liao, supra note 
50 at 1; The Children’s Charter of Japan (1951) declares that “All 
children shall be entitled to be brought up in their own homes with 
proper love”: Children’s Charter of Japan, 1951, online: 
<http://www.s-keimei.or.jp/houritu.htm>, cited in Liao, supra note 50 
at 1.  
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 
 
140 
parents are available.”99 Some parents (whether single or 
partnered) may successfully discharge their duty to love 
their children using only their own resources, with all this 
entails in terms of funds, emotional and physical reserves, 
and time. But many people may find this difficult without 
assistance, owing to the demands of employment, 
caregiving of other family members, the special needs of 
some children or parents, mental health challenges, or other 
factors.100 That other persons also have duties101 toward 
children can alleviate the burdens on the primary 
caregiver(s) and promote all children’s well-being. 
Examples abound of care for children by people in addition 
to biological parents. 
 
In African American and Indigenous communities, 
a network of people, in addition to biological mothers, have 
often cared for and raised children. 102  Grandmothers, 
                                                        
99  Liao, supra note 50 at 134. 
100  Ibid at 138. 
101  Liao notes that other people who are not biological parents, but also 
have the duty to love children need not do the same thing as parents to 
fulfill their responsibilities. They might support better childcare 
programs and more flexible workplace policies or pay taxes and vote 
for governmental policies that help parents discharge their duties: ibid 
at 138, 140.  
102  See bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, 2nd ed 
(Cambridge, MA: South End, 2000) at 144; Patricia Hill Collins, Black 
Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of 
Empowerment (New York: Routledge, 2000) at 45, 173. Sarah Morales 
notes that historically in Coast Salish communities, grandparents or 
great aunts and uncles raised children, especially the first born. Within 
Hul’qumi’num family units, all the offspring of one’s aunts and uncles 
are considered to be your brothers and sisters: Sarah Noël Morales, 
Snuw’uyulh: Fostering an Understanding of the Hul’qumi’num Legal 
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aunts, other relatives, and non-relatives who are treated like 
family, have all been part of networks of care. Community-
based child care has historically been critical for Black 
women who had to leave the home to work and provide for 
their families.103 Where childcare is unaffordable or non-
existent, these other parents have played essential roles in 
child rearing. In South Asian communities, multi-
generational families are commonplace and numerous. 
Non-biologically-related adults may function as “aunties” 
and “uncles” to a child. 104  bell hooks described the 
tradition of multiple parents and people who do not have 
biological children sharing child rearing as “revolutionary 
parenting.”105 She noted that it is revolutionary in that it 
opposes the Western ideology that maintains that two 
                                                        
Tradition, (DCL Thesis, University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, 2014) 
[unpublished] at 114. 
103  hooks, supra note 102 at 144. 
104  Indeed, it may be that Natasha was particularly open to becoming a 
nonconjugal co-parent because she was raised in an immigrant Indian 
and Pakistani community in Toronto in which the majority of her local 
“extended family” were not biologically related to her. Lynda, in turn, 
was raised in a blended family with four parents—two biological 
parents and two step-parents who arrived at different points in her 
childhood and brought with them step-siblings and a half-sibling. We 
both learned through experience that love makes a family. 
105  hooks, supra note 102 at 133. See also Adje van de Sande & Peter 
Menzies, “Native and Mainstream Parenting: A Comparative Study” 
(2003) 4:1 Native J Soc Work 126 at 129; Angela Mae Kupenda, “Two 
Parents are Better Than None: Whether Two Single African American 
Adults—Who Are Not in a Traditional Marriage or a Romantic or 
Sexual Relationship with Each Other—Should Be Allowed to Jointly 
Adopt and Co-Parent African American Children” (1997) 35:4 U 
Louisville J Fam L 703 at 707.  
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biological heterosexual parents, and in particular mothers, 
should be raising children.106    
 
The communal caring for children by numerous 
people in addition to biological mothers, also known as 
“alloparenting”,107 may also be seen as evolutionary; the 
practice dates as far back as the hunter-gatherer period.108 
Anthropologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy has argued that human 
evolutionary history is characterized by cooperative 
offspring care. She notes that homo sapiens could never 
have evolved if human mothers had been required to raise 
children on their own. Because infants are so dependent at 
birth and remain so for years, mothers had to rely on social 
supports extending beyond their own kin to raise their 
young.109 Hrdy compellingly suggests that cooperation in 
child care was crucial to human success in ancestral 
hunting and gathering groups.110  
 
                                                        
106  See Bella DePaulo, “Why Friends Should Have Full Legal Rights as 
Co-Parents”, (31 March 2017), Single at Heart with Bella DePaulo, 
Ph.D. (blog), online: <blogs.psychcentral.com>. 
107  The Oxford English Dictionary defines alloparent as “An adult animal 
or person involved in parent-like care of an individual which is not his 
or her offspring.”:  The Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo 
“alloparent”. 
108  Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of 
Mutual Understanding (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2009) at 32. 
109  Ibid at 270. 
110  Ibid at 271. 
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Contemporary permutations of alloparenting 111 
likely also exist in abundance, though the area is arguably 
understudied. One documented example concerns a remote 
community in northern Tanzania, where the Kurya 
Indigenous people have a longstanding tradition of 
heterosexual women marrying each other in order to 
preserve their homes and lifestyles without husbands. The 
women live, cook, and raise children together, though they 
are not lovers. Women may take male lovers, but any 
resulting children are raised in the female marriage.112 This 
practice has seen a resurgence recently, as women seek 
more freedom and power.113 In Western societies, adults 
are similarly seeking multiple paths to family formation, 
including intentional nonconjugal parenting units.  
 
In 2014, the New York Circuit Court heard an 
uncontested second parent adoption application by two 
friends who were co-parenting a child.114 The parties were 
long time co-workers and friends. Although they were 
“opposite-sex” co-parents, they did not live together and 
                                                        
111  “In a number of cultures, both within and outside the United States, 
community members often come together to raise children, with 
friends of the biological parents assuming a parental role in the child’s 
life.”: Feinberg, supra note 13 at 802. See also Kupenda, supra note 
105 at 712. 
112  Coontz, supra note 12 at 26–27.  
113  WITW Staff, “In Tanzania, Straight Women Are Marrying One 
Another”, New York Times (2 August 2016), online: 
<nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2016/08/02/in-tanzania-
straight-women-are-marrying-one-another/>. See also Coontz, ibid at 
27.  
114  Matter of G, 251 NYLJ (3d) 26 (Sur Ct, NY County 2013) [Matter of 
G].  
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had never dated. The friends tried to have a child together 
using assisted reproduction, however, they were not 
successful in conceiving. They decided to adopt a child, 
travelling together to Ethiopia for the adoption. Since the 
parties were not married and could not legally adopt in 
Ethiopia, they decided that the mother would adopt their 
daughter on her own and wait until their return to New 
York before bringing an application for a second parent 
adoption. The parties also both agreed that if they were 
unsuccessful in obtaining a second parent adoption, they 
would continue to co-parent together informally. When the 
child was two years old, the parties applied jointly for a 
second parent adoption. The court interpreted section 110 
of the Domestic Relations Law, which had been amended 
to permit adoption by “any two unmarried adult intimate 
partners together”115 to include nonconjugal partners. In 
her analysis, Justice Mella held that the 2010 amendment 
to the Act, suggested the legislature intended for the phrase 
to encompass more than just common law partners. Indeed, 
the court stated, “the experience of jointly and intentionally 
parenting a child is itself of the most intimate nature.”116 
                                                        
115  DOM § 110 (2014) [emphasis added].  
116  Matter of G, supra note 114 at para 24. In Matter of A, 27 Misc 3d 304 
(Fam Ct, Queens County 2010), the court permitted a paternal 
grandmother and a paternal aunt to jointly adopt three children. The 
mother and aunt lived together and were committed to each other and 
to the three children. Similarly, in Matter of Chan, 37 Misc 3d 358 (Sur 
Ct, NY County 2012), the prospective parent who had previously lived 
with the mother and had been a “functional parent” but was not a 
spouse or living with the mother in a conjugal relationship, established 
that the adoption would be in the best interests of the child. However, 
in the earlier case, Matter of Garrett, 17 Misc 3d 414 (Sur Ct, Oneida 
County 2007), the court denied the joint petition adoption by a natural 
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The judge was also satisfied that the child’s best interests 
would be served by having her father recognized as a 
parent given that the friends actually functioned as the 
child’s parents and had created a nurturing family 
environment.117  
 
Many people are now connecting on co-parenting 
websites such as Modamily118  or Family By Design,119 
which offer opportunities to find co-parents as well as 
resources for navigating the parenting partnership process. 
This can include single people who want to have a child 
and share responsibilities for raising the child together 
without necessarily being in a romantic relationship. Some 
have suggested that the decoupling of romance and 
marriage from having children is a positive step that, 
especially for women, removes the pressure to find the 
right romantic relationship in order to become a parent.120 
Indeed, single mothers by choice have also cited this 
rationale for their mothering decisions.121  
 
                                                        
mother and her biological brother for him to become the child’s legal 
father.  
117  Matter of G, supra note 114 at para 6. 
118  Modamily, online: <www.modamily.com>.  
119  Family by Design, online: <www.familybydesign.com>.  
120  See Makda Ghebreslassie, “Partners in Parenting, Not Love: Singles 
Pair up to Raise A Child”, CBC News (15 February 2017), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/news>. 
121  See Rachel Lau, “Single Parent by Choice: Women Turn to Sperm 
Donors to Conceive”, Global News (27 April 2017), online: 
<globalnews.ca/news>. 
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In terms of stability, many people enter conjugal 
relationships in search of the one person with whom they 
expect to spend the rest of their lives. However, these 
relationships arguably involve a greater chance of 
dissolution than close friendships, which studies show are 
often important, stable, intimate, and committed.122 “Many 
women report feeling emotionally closer to their female 
friends than to their husbands; and research shows that 
women usually make a deep commitment and devote a 
great deal of time and intensity to their friends.”123 
 
This is not to suggest that nonconjugal co-parenting 
units are superior to their more traditional counterparts. 
Indeed, in our view, our case stands for the proposition that 
there is no limit to the configurations of relationships that 
can support the healthy raising of children. Natasha’s 
decision to co-parent with Lynda after initially thinking she 
would be a single mother by choice should not be taken as 
a statement about the capacity of single mothers (or 
fathers) to effectively raise children with or without 
disabilities.124 Our co-parenting arrangement came about 
                                                        
122  See Feinberg, supra note 13 at 812. Among the Na community in the 
Yunnan Province of southwestern China, brothers and sisters live 
together in non-incestuous relationships, jointly raising, educating, and 
supporting the children to whom the sister gives birth. “Among the Na, 
sibling relationships are much more meaningful and long-lasting than 
love affairs or sexual relationships. . . some of the sibling-based 
households . . . remained together for ten or more generations, with 
brothers and sisters practically inseparable—‘companions for life.’”: 
Coontz, supra note 12 at 32–33. 
123  Feinberg, supra note 13 at 812. 
124  Indeed even “single mothers by choice typically rely on support 
networks of various forms, refuting any notion that their autonomous 
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organically and we felt that it worked for each of us—and 
especially for Elaan. The most effective parenting requires 
being flexible in form so as to be able to respond to all 
parties’ needs and interests as they evolve.  
 
Moreover, parenting does not occur in a vacuum. 
Many people play crucial roles in a child’s life and parents 
and children require ongoing support from multiple 
sources.125 This is especially the case for parents raising 
children with complex disabilities. That nonconjugal co-
parenting has been a necessary part of our history and 
continues to exist in more contemporary cultural practices 
suggests that States, social agencies, and other institutions 
should support conditions for all kinds of relationships that 
further children’s right to be loved126 without reference to 
conjugality. Regardless of the gender, dis/ability, sexual 
orientation, race, religious background, biological 
connection to the child, or marital status of the parent(s), 
most families want what is best for their children. They 
                                                        
motherhood is conducted in splendid isolation.”: Boyd, supra note 10 
at 15. 
125  As we write this section of the paper, we are sitting in a hospital room 
while our dear friend strokes Elaan’s hair to help him sleep. She has 
become a significant support to both of us and yet another adult that 
Elaan can rely on. Because parenting a child (certainly any child, but 
especially one with complex disabilities) is so incredibly unpredictable 
and time-consuming, we are ever grateful for all of the day-to-day care 
we get from family, friends, our different communities, and 
professional resources.   
126  Liao, supra note 50 at 139. 
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want to be able to create a home or homes that are safe, 
loving, and happy environments.127  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The traditional family structure no longer reflects the 
realities of modern day parenting. As same-sex couples, 
single parents, blended families, and multiple parent 
families have demonstrated, non-traditional families can 
and do provide children with the love, support, and stability 
they need to flourish. Family law recognizes and protects 
many such non-traditional family compositions. Given this 
shift in both society and family law, it makes little sense to 
deny individuals the latitude to determine which important 
relationships should be brought within the scope of law.128 
 
We believe that our case shows that family law 
ought to be steered in the direction that “exalts freedom, 
honours commitment and encourages care.”129  If family 
policy explicitly privileges conjugal relationships or 
nonconjugal relationships that are only formed in one 
particular way (for example, before conception), it will fail 
to offer much-needed support to more vulnerable families, 
including those raising children with complex disabilities. 
There was certainly a desperate need to restructure 
parentage laws in Ontario, as the All Families are Equal 
Act did. However, it ought not to have restricted the ability 
of judges to determine when a novel family formation is in 
                                                        
127  See Joshua Gamson, Modern Families: Stories of Extraordinary 
Journeys to Kinship (New York: NYU Press, 2015). 
128  Beyond Conjugality, supra note 73 at 117. 
129  Civita, supra note 71 at 12. 
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the best interests of a child. We must leave open the 
possibility for love to be imagined in ways we had not 
anticipated. The interest in parenting partnerships may well 
grow as the number of single people continues to 
increase. 130  This may result in a rejuvenation of older 
familial practices or new incarnations of parenting. What 
ought to matter is the love and care that children have the 
right to receive. As society acknowledges the ever-
                                                        
130  See Bella DePaulo, “What Has Changed for Single Americans in The 
Past Decade”, The Washington Post (20 September 2016), online: 
<www.washingtonpost.com/news>; Claire Brownell, “They’re One of 
Canada’s Fastest Growing Demographics, So Why Are Politicians 
Ignoring The Single Voter?”, National Post (12 June 2015), online: 
<news.nationalpost.com>. 
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expanding cadre of family compositions,131 law should not 
lag behind.132  
                                                        
131  The interest and fascination with non-traditional families is evident in 
popular culture. See Three Men and a Baby, 1987, DVD (Burbank, 
Cal: Touchstone Home Entertainment, 2002); Kate and Allie—The 
Complete Series, 1984, DVD (Pointe-Claire, Que: Unidisc Music Inc, 
2010); Modern Family: The Complete First Season, 2009, DVD (Los 
Angeles: 20th Century Fox Home Entertainment, 2010); Full House: 
The Complete Series Collection, 1987, DVD (Burbank, Cal: Warner 
Home Video, 2015); Sister, Sister: The Complete Collection, 1994, 
DVD (Toronto: Visual Entertainment Inc, 2016); Two and a Half Men: 
The Complete Series, 2003, DVD (Burbank, Cal: Warner Home 
Entertainment, 2015); Fuller House: The Complete First Season, 2016, 
DVD (Burbank, Cal: Warner Brothers, 2017); The L Word Complete 
Series, 2004, DVD (Hollywood: Paramount Pictures Home 
Entertainment, 2011). We recently rediscovered that even the classic 
Canadian novel Anne of Green Gables by Lucy Maud Montgomery 
involved the nonconjugal parenting by a brother and sister of an 
orphaned girl, while the sequel chronicles the formation of another 
family involving two women friends (Marilla and Rachel Lynde) 
raising adopted children together. LM Montgomery, Anne of Green 
Gables (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1968); LM Montgomery, 
Anne of Avonlea (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1968).   
132  Another area in which family law is lagging behind the reality of 
modern parenting, is the prohibition in BC’s Family Law Act that does 
not permit the creation of parenting agreements or domestic contracts 
related to a child’s upbringing before separation: See FLA (BC), supra 
note 83, s 44(2). This legislative provision was created at a time when 
it was thought children were only being raised in the context of a 
conjugal couple that lives in the same household. With the recognition 
of multiple-parent and nonconjugal-parent families who never intend 
to live together, this section must be amended so parents can agree to 
parenting and guardianship responsibilities in an agreement should 
they so wish. See barbara findlay & Zara Suleman, Baby Steps: 
Assisted Reproductive Technology and the BC Family Law Act 
(Vancouver: CLEBC, 2013), online: <www.barbarafindlay.com > at 7. 
For an example of a parenting agreement, see Stacy, supra note 74 at 
332–334. 
